ARCTIC SENTINELS: Indigenous Agency and the Future of Arctic Strategy

Abstract 

Strategists have long viewed Greenland as a geostrategic fixture, measuring its significance solely by its military installations and critical mineral deposits.  The following analysis contends that such a viewpoint neglects a crucial reality: Greenland’s Inuit-majority government exercises decisive authority over environmental access and critical mineral licensing—decisions central to global energy security and advanced technologies.  Effective Arctic policy, therefore, depends on recognizing Indigenous peoples as strategic partners, not peripheral stakeholders. Drawing on Cold War operational history, contemporary Arctic governance frameworks, and supply chain geopolitics, the following analysis demonstrates why policymakers must place Indigenous agency at the center of Arctic strategy.  

I.  The Strategic Miscalculation

The gap between strategic foreign policy assumptions and Arctic realities has rarely been wider. Policymakers continue to analyze Greenland primarily through the lens of geography and military infrastructure, treating the island as a fixed asset in great power competition rather than as the homeland of a politically sophisticated Indigenous population whose consent and cooperation determine whether the Arctic policy interests of competing nations prevail or fail.

This longstanding misconception carries significant operational cost because it leads decision-makers to overlook critical realities on the ground.  When policy is predicated on reductive assumptions, the result leads to poorly calibrated initiatives, inefficient use of resources, and forfeited opportunities for meaningful engagement.   

Greenland's Inuit-majority government controls mineral licensing authority and environmental approvals, and the political legitimacy on which these decisions ultimately depend. The U.S. Pituffik Space Base—formerly Thule Air Base—operates under formal U.S.-Danish agreements, yet its long-term viability is increasingly conditioned on Inuit political sentiment.  The base's 1951 construction forcibly displaced Inughuit communities from Uummannaq, a grievance that remains unresolved and actively shapes Greenlandic attitudes toward American military presence.

As new Arctic shipping routes become accessible due to thawing permafrost and vast untapped mineral deposits are revealed, these historical grievances, combined with emerging economic leverage, grant Inuit leaders an unprecedented voice in shaping the region's future.  Countries that fail to incorporate this reality into their strategic planning are exposing their policies to significant risk. 

II. What the Cold War Actually Taught Us

The operational record of U.S. military activity in Greenland during the Cold War offers useful lessons. American planners learned, often at substantial cost, that technological superiority alone was insufficient for sustained Arctic operations.  Temperatures regularly dropped below minus forty degrees Fahrenheit, perpetual winter darkness degraded military readiness, and severe magnetic anomalies disrupted navigation instruments across wide operational areas.

Camp Century, a U.S. top-secret underground installation constructed in 1959 with a two-mile tunnel network, starkly illustrated these limits.  U.S. military engineers fatally underestimated the velocity at which Greenland's ice sheet would compress the tunnels.  The base was abandoned in 1967, leaving behind radioactive waste and 53,000 gallons of diesel fuel now threatened by glacial melt.  This legacy continues to generate diplomatic friction between Washington, Copenhagen, and Nuuk.

Arctic operational challenges during the Cold War were not solved by technological innovation but from partnerships with Inuit communities.  Indigenous weather prediction methods—derived from systematic, multigenerational observation of wildlife migration routes, ice formation patterns, and atmospheric phenomena—consistently outperformed conventional military meteorological forecasts.  Inuit navigation expertise enabled the safe movement of U.S. military personnel across hazardous terrain when electronic instruments failed.  During construction of the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line in the 1950s, an extension of radar and early warning outposts meant to detect Soviet bombers, Inuit advisors guided the movement of heavy equipment across permafrost and seasonal ice, thereby reducing accidents to U.S. personnel and dramatically decreasing operational delays.

Indigenous observers familiar with local ecological dynamics served as informal intelligence networks, reporting unusual activities or environmental changes that could signal security threats.  Historical reports highlight instances in which Inuit observers reported unfamiliar aircraft or altered wildlife migration patterns, prompting timely investigations by U.S. military authorities and thereby enhancing the overall security posture.  American military commanders who grasped this reality forged genuine partnerships; those who did not found their operations compromised.

The integration of Indigenous expertise marked a turning point in U.S. Arctic operations. American military planners increasingly recognized that Indigenous knowledge—rooted in centuries of lived experience—was indispensable for mission success.  The lessons learned during this period underscore the importance of partnership: operational resilience in the Arctic depends as much on relationships and trust as on hardware and infrastructure.

As the United States and other countries confront new challenges in the region—from environmental shifts to heightened geopolitical competition—the enduring value of Indigenous knowledge and collaboration remains clear.  Effective policy today requires building on this foundation, embedding Indigenous partnership at the center of Arctic policy.

III. Indigenous Agency in Contemporary Arctic Governance

The institutional architecture of contemporary Arctic governance formalizes Indigenous political authority in ways that geopolitics has been slow to internalize.  The Arctic Council, established in 1996, grants Indigenous organizations—including the Inuit Circumpolar Council—permanent participant status, affording them a voice in deliberations and active participation in meetings with the eight member states. While not without procedural deficiencies, this arrangement is unique in international diplomacy and reflects a structural reality that analysts frequently overlook.  For instance, during periods of geopolitical tension, particularly after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, longstanding Indigenous networks solidified through the Arctic Council continued informal political dialogue across national boundaries, sustaining lines of communication that neither government ministries nor military channels could maintain.  

Greenland's path towards independence further amplifies Inuit geopolitical agency. The 1979 Home Rule Act granted the government of Greenland local control over internal affairs, while the 2009 Self-Government Act went further, recognizing Greenland's Indigenous population as a distinct people under international law with rights of self-determination and full authority over resource management.  The result is a geopolitical environment in which Nuuk controls access to critical minerals and natural resources, and grants environmental authority, while Denmark retains responsibility for foreign affairs and the defense of the island.  

Nations interested in investing in Greenland’s abundant critical minerals must deal directly with the country’s Inuit government.  In 2021, the government's decision to block the Kvanefjeld rare-earth and uranium mine—estimated to hold the world's second-largest rare-earth deposit and fifth-largest uranium reserves—demonstrated the concrete exercise of this authority.  The project, which includes a 10 percent stake held by China’s Shenghe Resource Corporation, was halted not by Danish veto or American pressure, but by Indigenous-led opposition to radioactive contamination risks, expressed through democratic processes.

The application of Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) principles—enshrined in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples—affirms the authority of Indigenous peoples to grant or withhold consent for mining, logging, and infrastructure projects that impact traditional lands, territories, and resources. Greenland's Mineral Resources Act reinforces Indigenous agency in domestic law, requiring companies to partner with Greenlandic firms and integrate local environmental priorities.  Any foreign government or corporation seeking to access Greenlandic resources must operate within this Indigenous-led framework.

IV. The Geopolitical Stakes

China and Russia have each developed Arctic strategies that account—in different ways—for the Indigenous governance dimension, even as their approaches diverge sharply.  Beijing's 2018 Polar Silk Road policy designated China a "near-Arctic state" and sought preferential access to Greenlandic mineral ventures. Those policy ambitions remain constrained by Indigenous resistance. Yet Beijing continues to pursue influence through infrastructure investment and scientific cooperation.

Russia, meanwhile, has reopened and modernized Soviet-era Arctic military installations, expanded nuclear submarine operations, and systematically invested in Arctic-capable logistics. Moscow has simultaneously engaged Siberian Indigenous communities in ways designed to legitimize Russian Arctic claims under international law—a form of strategic co-option.

The Arctic is warming at approximately four times the global average, accelerating permafrost thaw, disrupting traditional subsistence systems, and redrawing navigable routes with consequences that no fixed strategic map can capture. In this political context, Indigenous traditional knowledge—rooted in lived experience—constitutes an adaptive intelligence asset of the first order.  Indigenous-led conservation initiatives and the emerging doctrine of Indigenous data sovereignty represent not merely advocacy positions but established frameworks for evidence-based governance amid accelerating geopolitical change.

Conclusion

Greenland is not an asset to acquire or a contested territory.  It is home to a self-governing Indigenous people who exercise sovereign authority over the resources and conditions that define Arctic policy.  The Cold War record, the contemporary governance architecture, and the emerging geopolitics of critical minerals all point to the same strategic conclusion: Arctic policy is fundamentally built on acknowledging and recognizing Indigenous peoples as primary strategic partners.  

Countries wishing to be relevant political actors in Arctic policy can invest in the authentic, reciprocal partnerships that Inuit communities have repeatedly demonstrated they are prepared to sustain.  Or these same countries can continue to engage Greenland through the outdated prism of territory and military installations and watch as more strategically perceptive actors build the relationships that matter.  In the Arctic, as in every domain where Indigenous peoples exercise sovereign authority, the fundamental question is not whether they will shape outcomes – they will.  The question is whether countries will recognize this reality in time to remain relevant in a rapidly changing region.  

About the Author

Michael A. Orona has served at the U.S. Department of State for 25-years where he has held an array of senior foreign policy positions, including serving as Senior Advisor for International Indigenous Issues and Global Strategy. His government career includes serving at the White House as NSC Director for Africa Affairs and at the U.S. Embassy in Hanoi, Vietnam. He holds a J.D. and M.S. in Military and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Marine Corps University Command and Staff College. He is a published novelist, and member of the Chihene Apache Tribe and of Yaqui Ancestry. The views expressed are his own and do not represent U.S. government policy.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not represent the official policy or position of the United States Government.

Notes

1. Barry Scott Zellen, On Thin Ice: The Inuit, the State, and the Challenge of Arctic Sovereignty (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2009), 123–167; Michael Byers, Who Owns the Arctic? Understanding Sovereignty Disputes in the North (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 2009), 89–134.

2. Marie-Louise Holle, "The Forced Relocation of Indigenous Peoples in Greenland: Repercussions in Tort Law and Beyond" (working paper, Copenhagen Business School, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3492655. 

3. Oran R. Young, Arctic Politics: Conflict and Cooperation in the Circumpolar North (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1992), 234–289, https://archive.org/details/arcticpoliticsco0000youn. 

4. Cooperative Institute for Research in Environmental Sciences, University of Colorado Boulder, "Greenland and the Legacy of Camp Century," August 2, 2016, https://cires.colorado.edu/news/greenland-and-legacy-camp-century. 

5. William Colgan, Horst Machguth, Mike MacFerrin, Jeff Colgan, et al., "The Abandoned Ice Sheet Base at Camp Century, Greenland, in a Warming Climate," Geophysical Research Letters 43, no. 15 (2016): 8091–8096, https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/2016GL069688. The study estimates that 200,000 liters of diesel fuel and radioactive coolant water now threaten to re-emerge as ice melts.

6. Henry Huntington, "Using Traditional Ecological Knowledge in Science: Methods and Applications," Ecological Applications 10, no. 5 (2000): 1270–1274, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2641282. Huntington's co-production framework has become a standard reference for the integration of Indigenous environmental knowledge with conventional scientific methodologies in Arctic research.

7. Shelagh Grant, Polar Imperative: A History of Arctic Sovereignty in North America (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 2010), 312–319. Grant examines the DEW Line's dependence on Indigenous logistical expertise.

8. Arctic Council, "About the Arctic Council," https://arctic-council.org/about/.  The Inuit Circumpolar Council holds Permanent Participant status alongside five other Indigenous organizations: the Aleut International Association, Arctic Athabaskan Council, Gwich'in Council International, Russian Arctic Indigenous Peoples of the North, and Saami Council.

9. Act on Greenland Self-Government, Danish Act No. 473 of 12 June 2009; Law Library of Congress, "Greenland's National Day, the Home Rule Act 1979, and the Act on Self-Government (2009)," June 2019, https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2019/06/greenlands-national-day-the-home-rule-act-1979-and-the-act-on-self-government-2009/.  For legal analysis of its implications for Greenlandic sovereignty under international law, see Kristian Søby Kristensen and Jon Rahbek-Clemmensen, eds., Greenland and the International Politics of a Changing Arctic (London: Routledge, 2019), chap. 2.

10. European Commission, Study on the EU's List of Critical Raw Materials (Brussels: European Commission, 2020), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/344124852_Study_on_the_EU's_list_of_Critical_Raw_Materials_2020_Final_Report. 

11. Reuters, "Greenland's New Government Moves to Ban Uranium Mining," November 10, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/greenland-bans-uranium-mining-halting-rare-earths-project-2021-11-10/. 

12. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (September 13, 2007), arts. 10, 11, 19, and 32, https://social.desa.un.org/issues/indigenous-peoples/united-nations-declaration-on-the-rights-of-indigenous-peoples.  FPIC is the operative standard for resource projects affecting Indigenous lands and requires genuine consent—not mere notification or consultation—prior to project authorization.

13. Greenland's Mineral Resources Act, Act No. 7 of 7 December 2009, https://www.iea.org/policies/16966-greenland-mineral-resources-act.  The Act mandates local-content requirements and environmental assessments incorporating Indigenous community input. See also Mads Peter Heide-Jørgensen, "Governing the Sub-Surface: Mineral Licensing in Greenland," Polar Record 49, no. 3 (2013): 243–252.

14. State Council of the People's Republic of China, China's Arctic Policy (Beijing: State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, 2018), https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm. 

15. RAND Corporation, "Is the Polar Silk Road a Highway or Is It at an Impasse? China's Polar Strategy Seven Years On," February 6, 2025, https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/02/is-the-polar-silk-road-a-highway-or-is-it-at-an-impasse.html. 

16. Mathieu Boulegue, Russia's Military Posture in the Arctic: Managing Hard Power in a 'Low Tension' Environment (London: Chatham House, 2019), https://www.chathamhouse.org/2019/06/russias-military-posture-arctic. Russia reopened Nagurskoye Air Base on Franz Josef Land in 2014 and commissioned the Trefoil Arctic base in 2017.

17. Dina Sangreen, interview by author, McLean, Virginia, November 8, 2025.

18. M. Rantanen et al., "The Arctic Has Warmed Nearly Four Times Faster than the Globe Since 1979," Communications Earth and Environment 3, art. 168 (2022), https://www.nature.com/articles/s43247-022-00498-3.  The study, using multiple climate reanalysis datasets, confirmed an Arctic warming rate of 0.75°C per decade from 1979 to 2021, approximately 3.8 times the global mean rate.

19. Stephanie Carroll Rainie et al., "Indigenous Data Sovereignty," November 2019, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/341255746_Indigenous_data_sovereignty; Tim Davies et al., The State of Open Data: Histories and Horizons (Cape Town: African Minds, 2019), 300–319, https://idrc-crdi.ca/sites/default/files/openebooks/open-data/9781552506127.html. 

20. Global Indigenous Data Alliance, "The CARE Principles for Indigenous Data Governance," https://www.gidaglobal.org/care.