China's Middle East Math: Decoding the 1+2+3 Framework with Jonathan Fulton
- Mischa Khanna
- Sep 3
- 4 min read
On August 27th, the Civitas One Team attended the Atlantic Council’s Book Talk: China’s Middle East Math. This discussion was moderated by Yun Sun, Senior Fellow and Director of the Stimson Center China program. Sun was joined by Nonresident Senior Fellow of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, Jonathan Fulton. As a China-MENA expert, Fulton discussed his recent book Building the Belt and Road Initiative in the Arab World: China’s Middle East math.
The 1+2+3 Equation
In 2014, China and the Arab League met in Beijing for a biennial cooperation forum. At this time, PRC President Xi Jinping unveiled a prolonged plan, coined as the 1+2+3 cooperation pattern. This plan was intended to serve as a blueprint for how China was to allocate their diplomatic and economic energy to the Arab world. This strategy was released only months after the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative.
The 2014 China-Arab States Cooperation Forum(CASCF) proved to be pivotal. At this specific forum, Xi Jinping’s speech took a step further than rhetoric. He introduced a numbered policy framework to serve as a political tool for Chinese policymaking. The pillars of the framework are split into three tiers:
Hydrocarbons
Trade and Investment and Infrastructure Construction
Civil Nuclear Power, Renewable Energy, and Space Satellites
Hydrocarbons
Hydrocarbons refer to oil and gas, which form the backbone of China’s relationship with the Arab world. Energy is not simply one priority among many, rather it serves as the foundation on which all other cooperation rests. By placing hydrocarbons at the core of the framework, China acknowledges the strategic importance of energy security as the indispensable starting point of China-Arab relations.
Trade and Infrastructure
Fulton explains that delving into trade and investment and infrastructure construction requires a complex way of thinking. Trade with China has grown rapidly, making Beijing one of the top trading partners for many Arab countries. Looking at infrastructure, China has taken a lead on building large scale projects that tie the region to global supply chains. In turn, these projects create jobs, improve local connectivity, and generate opportunities for Chinese state-owned enterprises(SOEs)
Nuclear, Renewables, and Space
The most ambitious area of cooperation lies in this third pillar, civil nuclear power, renewable energy, and space technology. Fulton explains that China has tremendous nuclear capacity and other countries that can export such products are at the top of technological advancement. China has been building nuclear reactors; however, Fulton is unsure of where they will find this market. The only country to have received civil nuclear reactors is Pakistan.
The investment in renewable energy aligns with the Arab states’ post-hydrocarbon visions. Looking at countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE who are seeking to diversify their economies and prepare for a sustainable energy future.
Core Engagement
As emphasized earlier, energy is the focal point. China is the top oil importer from the Gulf States. Much of its early engagement revolved around long-term oil supply agreements to secure energy flows. However, the framework reflects that countries cannot be reliant on hydrocarbons forever.
Many of the Arab governments have become focused on moving towards a post-hydrocarbon reality. This is evident with Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 and Abu Dhabi Vision 2030. China has recognized this as an opportunity for their SOEs to capitalize on their export capabilities. Technologies such as solar power, wind turbines, and EV manufacturing can serve both sides of the equation.
For developed economies, Chinese firms contribute renewable energy, digital infrastructure, and manufacturing partnerships that align with domestic visions. Countries with more acute economies, such as Egypt or Iraq, China’s projects take the form of technology parks or factories.
Second Tier Engagement
The Gulf Cooperation Countries(GCC) dominate most of China’s Middle East engagement. However, Fulton notes the emergence of a second tier mainly referring to Egypt, Iraq and Morocco. These three actors have made significant strides in attracting China’s investment and cooperation.
Fulton also mentioned the importance of three non-Arab Middle East countries: Iran, Israel, and Turkey. Despite there being some geopolitical constraints and these countries being nonapplicable to the 1+2+3 framework, China does still maintain a relationship with each nation.
A Complex Strategy Still Taking Shape
The Atlantic Council’s discussion with Jonathan Fulton highlighted the 1+2+3 framework as a flexible policy that is adaptable based on interest and need. Different Arab states are positioned differently within this equation. The Gulf Cooperation Countries remain the central focus of cooperation; however, countries such as Egypt and Morocco are rising in importance. Part of this differentiation stems from China’s use of strategic partnership diplomacy. Unlike alliances, which Fulton stresses China are not involved in, partnerships are interest based and hierarchical. The highest level of this hierarchy are the countries with Comprehensive Strategic Partnership status which include Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iran and recently Bahrain.
Still, China faces constraints in markets. Fulton explains U.S. companies remain the default choice particularly when access to American technology is easier and more attractive. Meaning, Beijing is competing at every level but making itself a secondary option or in industries where U.S. firms are less attractive.
Fulton’s analysis is that China’s role in the Middle East cannot be reduced to a single narrative. For policymakers, the challenge is to understand this layered engagement as a system of strategic relationships. China’s Middle East “math” is pragmatic calculations based on balancing opportunity, risks, and priorities.
Sources:
Atlantic Council. 2025. "Book talk: China's Middle East math" Atlantic Council, August 27, 2025. Accessed August 27, 2025. Book talk: China's Middle East math - Atlantic Council
